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In this note we will show how to get consistency for first order
classical logic, in a purely syntactic way, without going through
cut elimination. The procedure is very simple and it uses the
calculus of structures [WS] in an essential way. It also shows how
finitaryness (in the sense of finite choice of premises for each
rule) is actually a triviality (contrarily to what one would guess
from textbooks).
We all know that Gödel's incompleteness forbids easy solutions for
very expressive cases, so this method can't be a magic bullet for
the foundations of mathematics. Nonetheless, there are two points
that we believe are worthy:
1) The method is general and could be helpful for easy checking of
consistency in other cases.
2) This makes clear that there is no deep connection between cut
elimination and finitaryness, as entailed by the subformula property
(which in turn entails consistency).
First we give a general summary of the steps involved, for a generic
logic; then we get into the details for classical logic.
Consistency in Four Easy Steps
Step 1
Write your logic in the calculus of structures, making sure that the
rules are defined according to our recipe [AG1]. This ensures that
the cut rule can trivially be replaced by a cut rule in atomic form.
Then, you have the atomic cut rule, which is
         S(a,ÿa)
      ai↑------- .
          S{^}
where ^ is the unit for disjunction.
(In the sequent calculus, the cut rule cannot trivially be
restricted to atomic form. You'd have to go through full-blown cut
elimination.)
Step 2
Replace ai↑ by fai↑ (finitary cut, see [AG2]), which is:
2          S(a,ÿa)
      fai↑-------   where a or ÿa appears in S{ }.
           S{^}
Provability is not affected by this substitution: proving this claim
is almost trivial, and it probably always is for every system (look
at the proof below for classical logic).
This means that you get a system that proves the same logic, but all
its rules can only be applied in a finite number of different ways:
the equivalent of a subformula property.
This is a weak form of cut elimination: you only eliminate certain
cuts, those that introduce atoms that have nothing to do with
the conclusion of the proof. Doing this does not require going
through each and every mutual relation of rules in the system.
Step 3
Prove that falsehood, or empty, or any given structure, can not be
proved. This is consistency in a weak form, if you like. This is
very easy for classical logic and BV [AG3}. We guess it's the same
for other systems.
Step 4
Prove a stronger form of consistency, like: you can't have a proof
of R and another of ÿR at the same time. There is a nice easy trick
for doing this in the calculus of structures, given `weak'
consistency.
* * *
At this point you're done. Of course, you still can perform the
equivalent of the cut elimination in the sequent calculus. Why would
you want to do that anyway, since you already have finitaryness and
consistency? Because doing this reduces drastically the
nondeterminism of the system, and because it entails several other
proof theoretical properties. But it's not about consistency and
finitaryness, that connection was an artifact of the sequent
calculus.
Consistency for Propositional Classical Logic
We apply the procedure above to classical propositional logic. We
refer here to systems in [BT], reproduced below for convenience.
Step 1
Classical logic in the calculus of structures: here is a
presentation with atomic interaction rules and non-atomic
3contraction and weakening. Things work the same for the entirely
atomic presentation.
1) Language:
1) R, T and U stand for generic structures;
2) a is an atom, which is a structure;
3) f and t are structures, but not atoms; f stands for the unit
`false', t stands for the unit `true';
4) [R
1
,…,R
h
] and (R
1
,…,R
h
) are structures, for n > 0; [R,T] stands
for R ⁄ T, (R,T) stands for R Ÿ T;
5) the structure ÿR is the negation of R;
6) S{ } is a structure with a hole that does not occur inside a
negation;
7) S[R,T] and S(R,T) are shortcuts of S{[R,T]} and S{(R,T)},
respectively;
2) Equations:
Structures are considered equivalent modulo =, so defined:
1) associativity and commutativity of […] and (…): e.g.,
[((a,b),c),d] = [d,(a,c,b)];
2) De Morgan: e.g., ÿ[a,(b,c)] = (ÿa,[ÿb,ÿc]).
3) units: [t,t] = t;   [f,R] = R;
             (f,f) = f;   (t,R) = R.
3) Rules:
1) Interaction:       S{t}        S(a,ÿa)
                  aiØ-------   ai↑-------
                     S[a,ÿa]       S{f}
2) Core:                 S([R,U],T)
                        s----------
                         S[(R,T),U]
3) Non-core:          S[R,R]       S{R}
                    cØ------    c↑------
                       S{R}       S(R,R)
                       S{f}        S{R}
                     wØ----      w↑----
                       S{R}        S{t}
A proof of R is a chain of rule instances whose premise is t and
conclusion is R, denoted by
      t
      | .
      R
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The rules ai↑ and w↑ are non-finitary, since, given a conclusion,
they yield infinitely many premises. Being non-core, w↑ can
immediately be eliminated by using a generic cut and wØ:
        S(R,[t,f]) = S{R}
       s-----------
        S[t,(R,f)]
      wØ-----------
        S[t,(R,ÿR)]
      i↑----------- .
           S{t}
Generic cuts can be reduced to atomic cuts by recursively applying
         S(R,T,[-R,-T])
       s----------------
        S(R,[-R,(T,-T)])
      i↑----------------
            S(R,-R)
          i↑------- .
             S{f}
So, the only infinitary rule we are left with is ai↑. How do we get
rid of it in case we have a proof?
Consider the rule
          S(a,ÿa)
      fai↑-------   where a or ÿa appears in S{ }.
           S{^}
This rule is finitary, and we're going to show that, given a proof
of R, we can always get a proof of R where no ai↑ appears, but the
only cuts that appear are fai↑ instances.
Take a proof of R and individuate the bottommost instance of ai↑
that violates the proviso, as in:
            t
            |
         S(a,ÿa)
      ai↑------- ,
          S{f}
            |
            R
where neither a nor ÿa appear in S{ }. We can then replace all
occurrences of a and ÿa in the subproof above S{f} with t and f,
respectively, and we still have a proof of R. All rule instances
stay valid or become trivial, for example
5         S{t}              S(t,f)
    aiØ ------   and   ai↑ ------ ,
        S[t,f]              S{f}
can just be removed, since t = [t,f] and (t,f) = f.
Please notice that if a or ÿa appeared in S{ }, this would not
work, because it could destroy the derivation from S{f} to R.
Proceeding inductively upwards, we remove all infinitary atomic
cuts.
Step 3
We have to show that there is no proof
      t
      | .
      f
After having done Step 2, we know that we can restrict ourselves to
the finitary case, which means that we just have to show that there
is no such proof when no atom appears in the proof. So, only f and t
can appear in the proof, and we essentially have to look at the
units' equations.
Let us call `boolean structure' any structure freely made from f and
t by [_,_] and (_,_). It's easy to show that f is not equal to t.
Then we just have to show that no rule, when applied to a boolean
structure, has premise t and conclusion f. This is simply done by
inspection of all rules, which means inspection of s, cØ and wØ.
Easy case analysis.
Step 4
We want to prove that if R is provable, then ÿR is not provable.
The following flipping construction is not possible in the sequent
calculus.
We assume that we have both proofs:
      t         t
      |   and   | .
      R        ÿR
We compose the two proofs by conjoining them:
      (t,t) = t
        |       .
      (R,ÿR)
6We flip the proof we've got, by negating everything and using the
corules for every rule instance (for this we need the entire system
above). We get the valid derivation
      [ÿR,R]
         |   .
         f
From this derivation, we can build
           t
      iØ------
        [ÿR,R]
           |  .
           f
We transform the identity iØ into several atomic identities (by
using the switch inductively) and then we have a proof of f from t,
which is forbidden. Contradiction.
Consistency for Predicate Classical Logic
We only sketch the argument, by noting the differences with respect
to the propositional case; see [BT] for details of the predicative
system.
We eliminate all those instances of atomic cut,
         S(p(t
1
,...,t
h
),ÿp(t
1
,...,t
h
))
      ai↑--------------------------- ,
                     S{f}
in which predicate symbol p does not occur in S.
This is done in the same way as in the propositional case. We
replace all occurrences of instances of p(t
1
,...,t
h
) by t and of
ÿp(t
1
,...,t
h
) by f. This works because the only extra rules in the
predicative case that care about atoms are:
1) the equation
      $x.R = "x.R = R   if x is not free in R;
2) the rule
        S{R[x¨t]}
      nØ---------- .
         S{$x.R}
Instances of both of them are still valid if t or f replaces
arbitrary atoms in R.
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